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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

UNI'J1 ED FACTORS, A CORPORATION,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

-vs. T. C. ASSOCIATES, INC., A Corpora ti on, and HARRY R. ULMER, JR.,
PAUL J. SUGAR, and SAM HERSCOVITZ,
Defendants and Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by United Factors against
the defendant Corporation and Harry R. Ulmer, Jr.
and Sam Herscovitz as individuals, on a guarantee
agreement for T. C. Associates, Inc., a Corporation; that
prior to the matter being tried on its merits, a stipulation was entered into which the appellants believe to
be contrary to the laws of the State of Utah, and a
Motion was filed to vacate the Stipulation and to allow
the appellants to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim and to set aside the stipulation; all of which was
denied by the lower Court and a Judgment was entPred based on the stipulation against the appellants as
individuals and in favor of the respondent, from which
the appellants as individuals appeal.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following the appellants Motion in open Court on
the 15th day of August, 1967, the Third District Judge,
Joseph G. Jeppson, denied appellants Motion to set aside
the Stipulation and for leave to file an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim and granted Judgment to the respondent upon their oral Motion in open Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek reversal of the lower Court's Order
denying appellants the right to file an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim and for an Order setting aside the
Stipulation and for an Order, ordering the case to be
remanded back to the lower Court so that the appellants
can assert all of their defenses both legal and equitable
which it was not allowed to do in the lower Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
That appellants, who were the defendants m the
lower Court, will be ref erred to in this Brief as appellants, and that the plaintiff and respondent in this Brief
will hereinafter be ref erred to as respondent.
T. C. Associates, Inc. was a Utah Corporation doing
business in Utah, and that the officers and incorporators
of said Corporation were Harry R. Ulmer, Jr., Paul J.
Sugar and Sam Herscovitz; that said Corporation was
engaged in the furniture business with its principal offices in Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Sam Herscovitz and Harry R. Ulmer, Jr. as individuals signed a written guaranty with the respondent,
United Factors, vvhich was later modified as to amount
2

hy verbal agreement of the parties limiting the joint liabilit.v as guaranteed to $10,000.00 for the account of
Bailey-Schmitz for the extension of credit to the T. C.
Associates, Inc. Corporation; that said guarantees were
signed by Harry R. Ulmer, Jr. and Sam Herscovitz on
May 3, 1965, and pursuant to said guarantees T. C. Associates, Inc. did commence to purchase merchandise
from Bailey-Schmitz.

That Bailey-Schmitz did then assign its accounts
recPivable of T. C. Associates, Inc. to United Factors, a
New York Corporation, which is the respondent in this
Brief.
That without any knowledge or information and
without the consent of the appellants, either corporately
or individually, the Evans and Black Carpet Mills account was also sold and assigned to United Factors,
who then proceeded to use the same guarantee of Harry
R. Ulmer, Jr. and Sam Herscovitz even though it was
not accepted nor authorized by the said appellants herein.
(R30, 31 Answer)
That prior to June 8th, 1966, T. C. Associates, Inc.
became delinquent in the payment of its accounts and
the respondent by and through its attorney commenced
legal action against T. C. Associates, Inc. and the individuals who were the alleged guarantors; Legal action
was commenced by an Acceptance of Service of the Summons only by the appellants attorney, Pete N. Vlahos,
but no Complaint was served on appellants by mailing
to appellants or any of its authorized agents nor by
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leaving a copy ~with tlw Ckrk of the Conrt. (R. 1, 2, an<l
3) Said Acceptance 1rns <lat Pd ,June 8th, 1966.
Shortly after ap1wllants attorney, Pete N. Vlahos,
accepted service of tlH' Summons only, he was hospitalized for an apparent heart attack. The appellants were
withont any l::nowledge of the AccqJtance of said Service
by their attorrn·~-- On Jnne 30, 19()(), a default Judgment
was entered against all of the appellants who were 1111awarc of any pending legal 8.ction brought against them
because they had no knowle<lge of a Summons being
S<'l'Yed on Pete N. Ylahos. Appellants attorney, Pete N.
Vlaho;s having been hospitalizrd was unable to notify the
appellants of the Smmnons because of his illness. (Transcript Page 9 and Affidavit of Attorney Pete N. Vlaho~
attached hereto.)
The appc~Jlants first became aware of the Judgment
after it wm; entered against them and immediately thereafter did retain Attorney Herschel J. Saperstein to represent them. AttornPy Herschel J. Saperstein by proper
Motion in the lower Court had the Default Judgment
set aside but the Order Appointing the Receiver was not
vacatPd. Owing to the failure of the lower Court to
vacak its Order Appointing Receiver (R17, 18 and 19),
T. C. Associates, Inc. was compelled to file in Bankruptcy
in the Ft•deral District Court of Utah.
On or ahont September 19, 19GG, the appellants,
Harry R. Ulmer, .Tr. and Sam Herscovitz, as individuals
did enter into a Stipalation allegedly au accord an<l
satisfaction for the unpaid debts allegedly due the
4

l'PS])Ondents by the Corporation, T. C. Associates, Inc.
for which there was no consideration.
Shortly thereafter appellants Sam Herscovitz and
Harry R Ulmer, Jr. reengaged Attorney Pete N. Vlahos
at which point Attorney Herschel J. Saperstein withdrew as Attorney of Record. Thereupon Attorney Pete
N. Vlahos made a Motion to vacate the Stipulation and
permit the appellants to file a Counterclaim and an
amended Answer which was denied and for which the
ap1wllants seek relief therefrom. (R43, 44, 45)
When the lower Court heard appellants Motion as
:::tated herein the lower Court stated "It did not care about
the law" (Transcript Page 5) and would not allow the
presentation of legal authority.
Upon the Court denying appellants Motion as indicated herein the respondent did then file a Judgment
from which the appellants as individuals are appealing.
Appellants Attorney Pete N. Vlahos tried to point
out to the Court that there were issues of law and fact
that the Court should hear rather than grant respondent
a Judgment since T. C. Associates, Inc. had assets in
the Bankruptcy Court to pay respondent the money due
it by T. C. Associates when distribution was made. As
of the date of the writing of this Brief no distribution
has been made. rrhe Stipulation provided that all payments made by Appellants apply on the Bailey-Schmitz
arcount and the balance from the Bankruptcy Court.
(R

51, 52, 53)
Respondents attorney by the terms of the Stipulation
5

did n~ceivt~ $500.00 attorn('Y foes. ~When Judgment was
Pnt<>n'd lw sought another $2,000.00 making the total
attorney fees $2,500.00 alltogether on an unpaid amount
of $2,73G.54.
At the time of appellants Motion to vacate the Stipulation and to allow appellants to file an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim appellants attorney Pete N. Vlahos
did rai~:w the issue that the appellants had a good and
valid defense because of a misjoinder of claims and a
misjoinde1· of parties and that said statement does not
appear in the Transcript and is referred to herein by
Attorney Pete N. Vlahos' Affidavit attached hereto.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT 1. That the lower Court erred in denying
appellants Motion to set aside the Stipulation and in
denying appellants the right to file an Amended Answer
and Counterclaim.
POINT 2. That the lower Court erred in granting
Judgment to the respondent on the Stipulation because
there was no consideration for said Stipulation even
though it purported to be an accord and satisfaction of
the claims of the respective parties.
POINT 3. That the lower Court erred in denying
appellants Motion to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim since there were triable issues of law and fact
and therefon~ contrary to the laws of the State of Utah.
POINT 4. That the lower Court erred in denying
appellants Motion ~when the appellants did in fact have
a good and valid defense of misjoinder of claims and

6

misjoinder of partit's and therefore contrary to the laws
of the State of Utah.
POINrr 5. rrhat the lower Court erred in granting
rt:spondent a Judgment since the Court had no jurisuiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION
AND IN DENYING APPELLANTS THE RIGHT TO FILE
AN AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM.

Under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
1953 the Code states as follows:
AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
PLEADINGS
(A) AMENDENTS
"A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive
pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within twenty
days after it is served. Otherwise a party may
amend his pleadings only by leave of Court or
by written consent of the adverse party; AND
LEAVE SHALL BE FREELY GIVEN WHEN
JUSTICE SO REQUIRES." (Emphasis appellants.)
'rl1e above Rule has been fairly digested and explored in Utah law and the Landmark case concerning
the amending of the pleadings is found in Johnson et. ux.
v. Brinkerhoff et. al., 57 P.2d 1132, a 1936 Utah Case.
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One of the points made by the appellant Brinkerhoff
on the appeal was that Johnson was permitted to introduce a new and different cause of action other than that
originally sued upon when he filed his second Amended
Complaint and the Court found that the Amended Complaint was filed before trial and the defendant's Answe1
thereto was filed before trial of the cause. The Court
stated on Page 1136:
"No prejudice is alleged or shown in allowing
the filing of the second Amended Complaint or
in refusing to strike such pleading. A more liberal
rule will be applied in cases where amendments
are offered under such circumstances than when
offered during or after trial, where the parties
may be taken by surprise or handicapped in the
meeting of new allegations."
The Court further went on to state on Page 1136:
"The rule, however is toward liberality in allowance of amendments to pleadings for the purpose
of permitting a complete adjudication of the matters in controversy and in the furtherance of
justice. The rule is well stated in 49 CJ 466, as
follows:
'Subject to such limitations as arise from tl;e
time at which they are sought and from thm
subject matter, the policy of the law is toward
liberality in the allowance of amendments and
to regard them favorably in order that the
real controversy between the parties may be
presented, their rights determined, and the
cause decided on the merits without necessary delay, hence, to allow amendments is
. '"
the rule; to refuse them, the excep t10n.
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Justice Folland in the case of Johnson v. Peck, et.
al., 63 P.2d on Page 253 stated:
"The policy of the law is toward liberality in the
allowance of amendments and to regard them
with favor to the end that the real controversy
between the parties may be settled. The liberality
exercised is greatest at the time suit is commenced
and decreases as the suit progresses."
That the question of pleadings and amendments to
pleadings was fully digested in the case of Hancock v.
Luke et. al., 148 Pac. 452.
In this case an action was brought by the plaintiff,
an attorney, who brought an action on a contract and
the defendant filed a lengthy Answer and no objections
were interposed by either party to the pleadings until
the case was called for trial when the plaintiff moved
for Judgment on the pleadings which Motion was granted
by the Court and Judgment for the plaintiff was entered
accordingly. The facts further show that the Attorney
for the defendant made a Motion to amend the Answer
and what transpired is quoted on Page 456 as follows:
"Mr. Armstrong, for defendants: Now we make
a Motion if the Court please to amend the Answer.
Mr. Wilson for plaintiff: We wish to resist that
Motion, of course, Your Honor, because it comes
too late. In the first place, there isn't anything
to amend. Mr. Armstrong: There are some allegations in the Answer that we hadn't noticed,
having been called into the case just lately that,
may be a little ambiguous. Mr. Snyder (for plaintiff): I submit, Your Honor, it is too late now.
Mr. Wilson: I would like to be heard on it if the
9

Conrt has any idea of entertaining it. The Court:
It will be overrnle>d. Mr. Armstrong: Take an
exception. Mr. Wilson: We ask for Judgment,
Your Honor. The Court: You may have it. Mr.
Armstrong: Exception. Mr. Wilson: We will
draw it up later and serve it on counsel. The
Court: We will just consider ourselves adjourned."
This ·writer asks the Court to notice the similarity
as to what occurred in the Hancock case and what transpired at the hearing on August 15th, 1967, when appellants attorneys asked the Court as follows:
Mr. Vlahos: "I may cite various cases concerning
it."
The Court: "I do not care about the law, but the
reason why. (Transcript Page 5)
and further the Court went on to state on Page 6 of the
Transcript as follows:
"The law is no excuse."
The Court in the Hancock case on Page 456 stated:
"Why, then, was the offer to amend not timely?
In case pleadings are assailed, must a party move
to amend before he is apprised of what the ruling
of the Court will be 1 We think not. We are of
the opinion, therefore, that the Motion for leave
to amend is timely. We are also of the opinion
that, under the circumstances, it constituted _reversible error for the Court to deny the Motion
for leave to Amend."
And in setting forth the general law of the case the Court
stated on Page 457 as follows:
"We can see no reason whatever why the defendants in this case should be denied the right of
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amendment when the exercise of that right is
a matter of daily occurrence in our court of justice. Trnc, motions for judgments on the pleadings may be rare, but that is no reason why the
right of amendment should be denied when timely
proposed as in the case at bar."
The Court in the case of Davis Vincent Ballard, by
Duane 0. Ballard his Guardian Ad Litem v. Wes Buist
and Ronald Baxter aka Ronny Baxter, 333 P.2d 1071
8 Utah 2d, 308, 1959 Utah Case.
The Brinkerhoff case was cited by the Court in
allowing the plaintiff upon proper Motion to amend the
Complaint to allow the Guardian Ad Litem, Duane 0.
Ballard to represent his minor son, David Vincent Ballard and the Motion was granted and the plaintiff Duane
0. Ballard was appointed as plaintiff's Guardian Ad
Litem after which the Guardian Ad Litem moved the
Court for permission to Amend the Summons and Complaint to show that plaintiff was suing by his Guardian
Ad Litem since the defendant was a minor and was in
the Armed Services of the United States and the Court
denied permission to amend the Summons and Complaint and granted a Motion by respondent's attorney to
quash the Summons and dismiss the action.
The Court stated on Page 1073 and 1074 as follows:
"In the instant case when the Court allowed a
guardian ad !item to be appointed it should have
allowed his motion to amend the process and
pleadings to show that the suit was being prosecuted by the infant through his guardian ad litem
under the prov1s10ns of Rule 4 (h) U.R.C.P.
11

1953 which provides that:
'At any time in its discretion and upon such
terms as it deems just, the Court may allow
any process or proof of service thereof to
be amended, unless it clearly appears that
material prejudice would result to the substantial rights of the party against whom
the process issued.' "
And the Court went on further to state Rule 15,
of the U.R.C.P. 1953 and stated on Page 1047 as follows:
"The amendments could prejudice none of the
parties, but could only tend to serve justice. To
disallow the amendments was an abuse of discretion. It has always been the rule in this state
to be liberal in the allowance of amendments to
the end that there can be a complete adjudication
of a controversy upon the merits and so that justice may be served."
And the Court stated in the Ballard case that the
matter be remanded and the lower Court was reversed
with directions to follow the high Court's decision.
Another case that was similar wherein the Court
allowed four amended Complaints was in the case of
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Clegg,
135 P.2d, 919, a 1943 Utah Case:
The facts are briefly that the defendant was elected
as treasurer of the Board of Education for Tooele County and on two different occasions he had bonds posted
with the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company,
one for $10,000.00 and one for $20,000.00, and ·with the
Board of Education's approval the defendant placed
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said sums of money in the Tooele County State Bank on
December 24, 1930, and on January 14, 1931. One week
after the defendant commenced his second term as treasurer, the bank closed its doors and failed and the Board
of Education had on deposit a sum in excess of $141,000.00, a portion of which they recovered from the assets
of the bank and a portion of which they sued the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. A settlement of
$14,500.00 was arrived at after which the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company brought action against
Clegg for Clegg's failure to use care in depositing said
sums of money and for failure to obtain sufficient security to see that the bank had ample funds to pay its
depositors.
A trial was had in this matter and after the trial
was over the Court made a minute entry on Page 921
as follows:
"The within entitled matter having been by the
Court taken under advisement, the Court now
renders its decision that Judgment be entered
against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant."
Thereafter the plaintiff made a motion to amend
its Complaint which motion over defendant's objection
was granted by the trial Court, a second amended Complaint was filed and a demurer to it was sustained. Demurrers to the third amended complaint which was filed
was also sustained. The fourth amended Complaint which
was filed sought recovery of $14,500.00 on the theory of
equitable subrogation and on the fourth amended Complaint the Court awarded Judgment to the Hartford In-
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surance Company from which this appeal was taken.
One of the contentions raised by the defendants
was that the Court erroneously allowed plaintiff to amend
to state an entirely new cause of action and the Court
in deciding this issue' stated on Page 922 as follows:
"Ho\\'PVer, the rule that a new or different cause
of action cannot be introduced by amendment cannot be taken litPrally. As pointed out by the California Supreme Court in a recent case, Klopstock
v. Superior Court, 108 P.2d, 90G, 910, 135 A.L.R.
318:

'It is obvious that the unqualified way in
which the rule is sometimes stated * * * cannot be accepted; for the most common kinds
of amendnH'nts are those in which complaints
are amended that do not state facts sufficient
to constitute a cause of action, and in these,
and often in the case of new parties, a new
cause of action is in fact for the first time
introduced. All that can be required therefore (to use the language of Mr. Pomeroy),
is that a wholly different cause of action
shall not be introduced.' "
And in citing the following case it was stated:
"In United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288
U.S. G2, 5~~ S. Ct. 278, 280, 77 L.ed. 619, Cardozo
J., states that the term "cause of action" ma.y
mean one thing when the question is whether it
is good upon demurrer, and something different
when there is a question of the amendment of a
pleading or of the application of the principle of
res judicata."
The Court further went on and stated on Page 922:
""\Y c have consistently encouraged all proper
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amendments to pleadings to the end of having a
full hearing on the merits of the entire controversy. Hancock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 148 Pac. 452."
Harman v. Yeager, 100 Utah 30, 110 P.2d, 352."
This trend toward a liberal construction of the
term is looked upon with favor in other jurisdictions.
Although the appellants in the instant case does not
intend introducing a new cause of action the case
is only cited to show the liberality of the Utah Courts in
granting leave to amend pleadings with the end result
being that the parties will be given their day in Court
and justice will prevail. It is stated in 71 C.J.S. 275:
"The fact that new matter may have been known
to the appellant at the time the original pleadings
was filed is not necessarily sufficient grounds for
denying the right to amend."
The case that is almost identical in point both in
facts and in law is the case that was cited previously
which is the case of Harman v. Yeager, et. al., 110 P.2d
352, a 1941 Utah case.
The facts of the Yeager case are almost similar to
the procedural circumstances as to the case presently
before the Court, and the facts briefly are as follows:
The plaintiff instituted an action against defendant,
Yeager, and others to quiet title to a small tract of land
in Salt Lake County. The Complaint was in the usual
form for actions to quiet title and an Answer was filed
with no demurrer to the Answer and when the case was
called for trial plaintiff upon suggestions of trial Court
moved for a Judgment on the pleadings. Defendant,
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Yeager, then asked leave to amend their Answer and
the Court denied the request for leave to amend and
entered Judgment on the pleadings in favor of plaintiff
quieting the title.
Defendants then obtained new counsel who moved
the Court to vacate the Judgment and hear the cause
on its merits, tendering a new and an amended Answer.
The Motion was denied and Yeagers appealed. The Court
stated on Page 354 as follows:
''When a demurrer is interposed timely, that is,
before the cause is set for trial, so that the pleadings may be examined and considered and if
necessary amended where such can be done without serious inconvenience to the parties, the public, and the orderly procedure of the Court's
business, it may be well to examine them quite
critically and resolve all doubts against the
pleader."
The Court further stated on Page 354:
"But when a party fails until the cause is called
for trial to demurrer and call the attention of
the Court and counsel to what he thinks substantial defects in a pleading, the pleading should
be liberally construed in favor of the pleader with
all reasonable inference from the facts pleaded
indulged with a view to a trial on the merits and
doing substantial justice between the parties."
And the Court then went on to cite the Hancock case
which stated:
"The Courts generally do, and always should, require the parties to proceed to the merits, if such
a course is permissable, after getting the allegations and averments contained in the pleadings,
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and the necessary inferences arising therefrom a
liberal construction and application." ...
"Viewing the Motion the ref ore as a speaking
demurrer, when the answer was held to be bad
and the defendant sought to amend, they should
have been granted such right unless under the
facts admitted there was no reasonable probability that they could state a defense or make an
issue on a matter material to plaintiff's cause
of action."
There are too numerous cases to cite before this
Honorable Court; the question that Court's should construe pleadings liberally. Even in view of all these cases
the lower Court denied appellants Motion to amend its
Answer and leave to file a Counterclaim. There would
certainly be no prejudice to either party if appellants
Motion had been granted, since most of the monies had
already been paid to the respondent by the appellants
when the appellants discovered additional information
that would give them good and valid defenses against
the allegations made by the respondent. This writer
believes the Court to be in error in denying appellants
Motion.
POINT 2.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
JUDGMENT TO THE RESPONDENT ON THE STIPULATION BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR
SAID STIPULATION EVEN THOUGH IT PURPORTED TO
BE AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OF THE CLAIMS
OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES.

As is stated by many writers an accord and satisfaction is no different than an ordinary contract and
there must be consideration in order to have an accord
and satisfaction agreement.
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In the instant case, the Stipulation that was entere<l
into was for the Pxact amount dne and owing allegedlv
to the respondent by the appellants. The Stipulation contains no facts nor recites any statement of any consideration given or sought by either party (R 51, 52, 53).
This is further substantiated by the Judgment of the
respondrnt accompanied by his Affidavit which sets forth
the payments made by the appellants to the respondent
and is computated ont hy the respondent for the same
amount that the respondent is claiming (R 55, 56). The
Stipulation that the appellants signed contained no consideration nor any consideration even if it was an accord
and satisfaction, said matter has been decided numerous
times and the following cases are set forth as evidence
of same.

In 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction, Section 1, Page
462, it stated as follows:
"An 'accord' is an agreement whereby one of the
parties undertake::; to give or perform, and the
other to acc1:~pt, in satisfaction of a claim, liquidated or in dispute, and arising either from contract or from tort, something other than or different from what he is, or considers himself,
entitled to; and a 'satisfaction' is the execution,
or performance, of such an agreement."
In 1 C.J.S. Accord and Satisfaction, Section 4, Page
473, it states as follows:
. provi'd es *' *' •
"Except where a statute otl ierw1se
an accord and satisfaction, like any other contract, must, in order to be valid and effectual,
be founded upon a proper consideration, a~d
where there is no consideration, the accord is
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nndPm padr<m, and so invalid and unenforceable.
The consideration may present itself in any of
numerous diffcT<'nt shapes or guises, but in some
form or other it must be present - there must
be either sonw advantage, or presumed or assmned advantage, accruing to the party who
yields his claim, or some detriment to the other
party."
From the citations of the C.J.S. it would appear to
he analogous to instant case because there was in fact
no consideration. The Stipulation that was signed was
no different than what the respondent was already claiming. All that the appellants are seeking at this time is
that the matter may be heard and tried by a jury with
all of the faets presented to avoid an unconscionable
injustice resulting to the appellants.

In the case of Metropolitan State Bank, Inc. v. Arthur Cox, Tribrme Grain Inc., Sullivan Inc., and William
E. Rust, 302 P.2d 188, a 1956 Colorado case the Court
on Page 192, 193 stated as follows:
"We think it sufficient to direct attention to the
statement of the Rule as set forth in 1 C.J.S.
Accord and Satisfaction, Section 3, P. 471 in sup. "
port of our cone1us10n.
'Inasmuch as an accord and satisfaction is
dependent upon contract, and requires a meeting of minds of the parties, the relevant facts
must be known to both parties, in order to
render it valid and effectual, and each party
must be apprised of the contentions of the
other. So an accord and satisfaction entered
into through or as a result of mutual mistake
of fact, ·where such a mistake by one of the
19

parties as to amount to a complete difference

betw.e~n what he supposed he was receiving

or g1vmg np and what was in fact received
or given,. so as to constitute a want of meeting
of the rnmds or an absence of consideration.'
* * *
The Court further stated:
"An agreement and its performance cannot constitute an accord and satisfaction of a claim or
demand, the existence of which was unknown to
the creditor when he made the agreement, nor
does the giving and receipt of a thing or promise
amount to or effect an accord and satisfaction
where it is the result of coercion or what is known
as "business compulsion."
As an analogy to the instant case this writer draws
the Court's attention to the fact that a Motion to set
aside the Stipulation and for leave to file an Amended
Answer and Counterclaim would not have been made
had not facts existed which did not become known to
the appellants until after the agreement was entered into.
In the case of Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, 72 P.2d 1060, 1937 Utah
case:
The facts in the instant case although not identical
to the case at hand show that the plaintiff, an oral surgeon, was injured and filed a claim with the defendant
under an insurance policy he had with the company; he
claimed a partial disability and some days of total disability as a result of this injury. Subsequent to this, the
defendant payed the plaintiff on this claim and later
the plaintiff claimed total disability which the insurance
20
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company refused to pay and the lower court held in
favor of the plaintiff from which the insurance company
appt·aled claiming the defense of accord and satisfaction.
The Court in affirming the lower Court's decision
stated on Page 1067 and 1068 as follows:
''His stating on the claim form and admitting
the correctness of a statement which specified an
item in pursuance of the claim for partial disability would seem at the most to involve only an
opinion of the plaintiff at the time he signed the
papers that he was for the time partially disabled.
If, as a matter of ultimate fact, arrived at through
legal interpretation of provisions of the policy,
together with a conclusion from the evidence,
his then opinion against himself was wrong, it
would not seem to be conclusive." * * *
Was it an accord and satisfaction 1 An accord is an
agreement between the parties, one to give a performance the other to receive or accept, such agreed payment
or performance in satisfaction of a claim. The "satisfaction" is the consumation of such agreement. There
must be consideration for the agreement. Settlement of
an unliquidated or disputed claim where the parties are
shown to be apart in good faith presents such consideration.
"Where the claim is definite and no dispute but
an admittance of its owing, the agreement to take
a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is
not good unless attended by some consideration.
In this case we do not see the elements of an accord and satisfaction."
In the case of Ralph A. Badger and Company v.
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Fidelity Building and Loan Association, 75 P.2d 669, a
1938 Utah Case :
rrhe facts were that the plaintiff Badger became the
owner of fifty shares of capital stock known as Investors
Guarantee Stock which were issued by the defendant
and which provided that the defendant promised to pay
upon maturity of the certificate the sum of $5,000.00
and when the time for maturity arrived the defendant
refused to pay said $5,000.00 and the plaintiff was
informed by the defendant that payments were not being
made on withdrawals and payment on the certificate for
fifty shares of stock were refused. The plaintiff had
received these certificate from one Arthur and Cecelia
LeClerc and had been reissued two twenty-five certificate stocks and when the Fidelity Building and Loan
Association refused to honor one of the certificates the
plaintiff sent the certificates to the Atlas Realty Company in Ogden, Utah, and sold one of the twenty-five
shares certificates for $1,250.00, said sum being one-half
of the value of said certificate.
The plaintiff later discovered that the Atlas Realty
Company had acted as agent for the defendant in procuring said certificates and that the money paid therefore had been furnished by defendant and the certificate
had been surrendered to the defendant by the Atlas
Realty Company and had been cancelled. The plaintiff
then brought suit to recover the difference between the
face amount of the certificate and the amount he had
received from the Atlas Realty Company for the certificate.
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The lower Court found for the plaintiff and the
F'id<'lit:v Building and Loan Association appealed raisi i1g' as a defense the accord and satisfaction. The Court
:-;takd on Page 676 the elements of an accord and satisfaction and quoted 1 Am. Jur. Page 217, Section 4.
'''l'he discharge of claims by way of accord and
satisfaction is dependent upon a contract expressed or implied; and it follows that the essentials necessary to valid contracts generally must
be present in a contract of accord and satisfaction. Therefore, the following elements are essential: (1) A proper subject matter, (2) competent
parties, (3) an assent or meeting of the minds of
the parties, and ( 4) a consideration." * * *
The Court further stated on Page 676:
"vVhere the claim is definite and no dispute but
an admittance of its owing, the agreement to take
a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction is
not good unless attended by some consideration."
In the instant case before this Honorable Court it
will be noted that the Stipulation is identical with the
amount claimed due and owing by the respondent in
its complaint; there certainly could not have been any
consideration for a new agreement which is identical
with what the respondent was already claiming. Therefore this writer submits that there was no consideration
for the Stipulation.

POINT 3.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION TO FILE AN AMENDED ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM SINCE THERE WAS TRIABLE ISSUES OF LAW AND FACT AND THEREFORE CONTRARY
TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

rrhe lower Court either ignored or overlooked the
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laws of the State of Utah as layed down by this Court
in the case of Baur v. Pacific Finance Co. et. al. found
at 383 P.2d 397. In that case the Court held and stated
as follows:
"We have heretofore declared, the granting a
motion to dismiss, which deprives the party of
the privilege of presenting his evidence, is a harsh
measure 'vhich Courts should grant only when it
clearly appears that taking the view most favorable to the Complaint and any facts which might
properly be proved thereunder, no right to redress
could be established; and unless it so clearly appears, doubt should be resolved in favor of allowing him the opportunity to present his proof."
344.

See also: Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d

In citing the above cases this writer draws the
Court's attention to the appellants Answer (R 29, 30,
31, 32, 33, 34) wherein the appellants have denied all
of the allegations contained in the respondent's Complaint (Rl and 2) and denied the guaranty of any
amount to Evans and Black Carpet Mills d/b/a E & B
Carpet Mills, Inc. That all respondents and the assignors
are out of state corporations with no registered agents
in Utah.
Further, the appellants stated set offs against two
of the assignors of the respondent who are not parties
to this action ( R 33, 34.) The Stipulation signed by the
appellants also make provisions to exclude their set offs
and this wrikr submits to this Honorable body that
the assignor Bailey-Schmitz is an indispensable party
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as set forth under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
1953 under Rule 19.
NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES:
"Subject to th0 provision of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of this rule, persons having a joint
interest shall be made parties and be joined on
the same side as plaintiffs and defendants. When
a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses
to do so, or his consent cannot be obtained, he
may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an
involuntary plaintiff."

I
\
(
'

I

I

lI
i

This writer submits that unless Bailey-Schmitz is
forced to become a party in this action that justice will
not be obtained and the result would be unconcionable
],ecanse the appellants would have to bring legal action
in the State of California against Bailey-Schmitz on their
setoff when all of said issues should be handled at one
time in an effort to avoid multiple suits.
It would appear therefore to this writer that there
were triable issues of law and fact, the Court should
have allowed the appellants the right to file an amended
Answer and Counterclaim and if necessary such additional pleadings as to join all necessary parties before
the Court so that equitable and substantial justice would
he done to all of the parties concerned.
POINT 4.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION WHEN THE APPELLANTS DID IN
FACT HA VE A GOOD AND VALID DEFENSE OF MISJOINDER OF CLAIMS AND MISJOINDER OF PARTIES AND
THEREFORE CONTRARY TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE
OF UTAH.

The Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of
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Stank v. Jones, 40L1 P.2d 9G4, 17 Utah 2d 96, a 19GfJ
Utah Case, decided this issue.
The facts in that case were that the plaintiff, a resident of Colorado, filed a Complaint containing twelve
causes of action which were allegedly assigned by seven
independent corporations and creditors and with each
cause having unrelated facts. The twelve cause of actions
were assigned for purposes of suit and collection; the
assignors retained a two-thirds interest in the amount
to be collected which was $76,000.00.
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah stated on
Page 965 and 966 as follows:
"Obviously, the seven assignors could not have
joined as })laintiffs and asserted their diverse and
unrelated claims in one action against the defendant. Why, then, should they be allowed to do indirectly what they could not do directly~

* * *

The claim of misjoinder was raised for the first
time on this interlocutory appeal. However, in
view of the fact that this accumulation of unrelated claims and the attempt to fuse them into
a composjte one produces an incongruity disruptive of proper and orderly procedure, we a:e
impelled to remand this cause for proceedings _rn
accordance with the conclusion stated in this opmion."
The Supreme Court in the Stank case held there
was a misjoinder of parties sent it back to the lower
Court and reversed the lower Court which held for the
plaintiff on its Complaint. In the concurring opinion
the Court stated:
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"Rule 20 (permissive joinder) the latter is conclusive in requiring that even if there could be a
joindc·r the claims must at least arise out of the
same transaction, - a circumstance wholly absent
here."
'l lte facts in the instant case before this Honorable
body is almost identical to the Stank case in that the
1

respondent in its original Complaint filed two unrelated
causes of action against the appellants (R 1, 2) and
further tlte respondent in its Complaint stated that the
appellants would not be entitled to any setoffs, defenses
or counterclaims which is contrary to the laws of the
f-ltate of Utah as stated in the Stank v. Jones case on
Page 966.
"An assignee dot's not acquire any greater right
than that possessed by his assignor."

It would appear therefore that when appellants attonwy in arguing his Motion argued that there was a
misjoinder of claims and a misjoinder of parties the
Court should have granted appellants Motion to file an
.Amc'rnled Answer and Counterclaim and if necessary
bring in all the necessary parties since two of the assignors are foreign corporations and unless the appellants can bring in these parties they would be irreparably
injured. Even the Stipulation provides that the appellants reserv<-> the right to any setoffs against one- of
tlw assignors, to-wit: Bailey-Schmitz Company.
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1953
ac: anwnded state as follows:
"Nece::;sary joinder of parties (a) Necessary join-
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der. Subject to tlw provisions of Rule 23 and of
~l~bdi.vision (b) of this rule, persons having a
JOmt mterest shall be made parties and be joined
on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.
When a person who should join as a plaintiff
refuses to do so, or his consent cannot be obtained
he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases,'
an involuntary plaintiff."
It would appear therefore that under our Rules of
Civil Procedure and in lieu of the Stank case that the
Court erred in not granting the appellants the Motion
as stated herein.
POINT 5.
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
RESPONDENT A JUDGMENT SINCE THE COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO GRANT SAID JUDGMENT.

Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 1953
as amended in 1964 provides the following:
"Rule 3. Commencement of action.
menced.

(a) How Com-

A Civil Action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint with the Court, or (2) by the service of a Summons. If the action is commenced by the service of
a Summons, the Complaint, together with the Summons
and Proof of Service thereof, must be filed within ten
days after such service and a copy of the Complaint
shall be served upon or mailed to the defendant if his
address is known; if unknown, a copy must be deposited
with the Clerk for him, or the action thus commenced
shall be deemed dismissed and the Court shall have
no further jurisdiction thereof; provided however, that
the foregoing provisions shall not change the require-
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ment of Section 12-1-8 Utah Code Annotated, 1953."
This writer draws the Court's attention to the docuill<'nt entitled Acceptance of Service of Summons dated
Jrnw 8, 1966, and signed by the instant writer (R 3).
11 he record is devoid that a copy of the Complaint was
1·ver received or that the appellants attorney ever acknowledged the acceptance of a copy of the Complaint
and this writer draws the Court's attention to the Complaint (R 1, 2) and note that nowhere does a Certificate
of Mailing show that a copy of the Complaint was at
any time ever mailed to the appellants attorney, whose
address was well known since the Acceptance of Service
had previously been mailed to him and this writer draws
tl1c Court's attention to the fact that all other documents in the record show Certificates of Mailing with
the exception of the Complaint which at no time shows
that a Complaint was mailed to appellants attorney or
that a copy of the Complaint was filed with the Clerk's
Office and as stated in Rule 3, since this is jurisdictional,
the failure of the respondent to either mail a copy of
the Complaint to the appellants or to file a copy with
the Clerk of the Court, the Court lost the jurisdiction
to enter any further orders and that all orders entered
thereunder are void and should be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons it is respectively submitted that the failure of the lower Court to grant apJl<'llants Motion to set aside the Stipulation and for leave
to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim should
l1avc' been granted and the lower Court erred in granting
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Judgment to the respondent smce the Court had lost
its jurisdiction and the matter should be reversed and
remanded back to the lower Court where the matter
should be dismissed in its entirety with all monies paid
thereunder being returned to the appellants by the
respondent. That as alternative relief the appellant is
requesting that the matter be remanded back to the lower
Court so that the appellants can file an Amended Answer and Counterclajm so as to assert all of its legal
and equitable defenses in Court so as to receive and
avail themselves of due process of law.
Respectfully submitted,
PETE N. VLAHOS
Attorney for Appellants
and Defendants
302 Eccles Building
Ogden, Utah
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STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT
SS.

COUNTY OF \VEBER
PETE VLAHOS, being first duly sworn upon
his oath deposes and says:
That he is an Attorney practising law in Ogden,
Utah, with his offices at 302 Eccles Bldg., Ogden, Utah,
and authorized and licensed to practice law by the State
of Utah in and for the State of Utah.
That as a duly licensed attorney your affiant herein
came to represent the defendants and appellants in the
matter before this Court and on or about August 15th,
19G7, appeared before the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson,
upon a Motion to set aside a Stipulation and for leave
to file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim.
That included in your affiant's argument to the
Court was the fact that there was a misjoinder of
parties and a misjoinder of actions which the transcript is void of.
That this Affidavit is given in support of appellants
argument to the Supreme Court as one of the points
that the lower Court erred in denying appellants Motion.
DATED this 13th day of November, 1967.
PETE N. VLAHOS
8ubscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of
November, 1967.
JOLENE ZANDEL
Notary Public
Residing at Ogden, Utah
My Commission Expires 6-5-69
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AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF UTAH
SS:

COUNTY OF WEBER
PETE N. VLAHOS, being first duly sworn upon
his oath deposes and says:
That he is a duly dicensed attorney authorized to
practice law in the State of Utah with his offices located at 302 Eccles Bldg., Ogden, Utah.
That on or about June 8th, 1966, your affiant herein
accepted service of a Summons in the matter of United
Factors, a Corporation vs. T. C. Associates, Inc., pending in the District Court of Salt Lake County, bearing
Civil No. 165056.
That on or about June 13th, 1966, your affiant was
stricken what was his doctor thought to be a second
heart attack within two months and was hopsitalized
at the St. Benedict's Hospital from that date until
September 1st, 1966, when your affiant again resumed
the practise of law at his same address hereinafter designated.
That your affiant further states that at no time
during said period of time did he receive a copy of a
Complaint and that his Acceptance was only for the
Summons and not for a Complaint which has never
been mailed or served upon your affiant herein.
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That this Affidavit is given in support of the appellants Appeal before the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah which is pending and for which Briefs are to be
filed.
DATED this 13th day of November, 1967.
PETE N. VLAHOS,
Affiant and Attorney for Appellant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day
of November, 1967.
JOLENE ZANDEL
Notary Public
Residing at Ogden, Utah
My Commission Expires 6-5-69
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